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Abstract 
Discussions on how to organize European labour markets are one of the key public 
policy issues of today. In European policy debates, the most important concepts 
seem to be ‘flexicurity’ and the ‘transitional labour market’. In this report we 
examine the cross-country variation in the generosity of unemployment benefits, 
which is a key element of the flexicurity model. Building on the political economy 
literature, we test hypotheses on the role of partisan politics, employment relations 
and employment protection legislation and active labour market policies in 
unemployment benefit reform. These factors have been extensively studied in the 
political economy literature, but hardly for Eastern European countries, because of a 
lack of data. We employ pooled time series cross-section regressions to analyze 
newly constructed indicators for Western and Eastern European countries. The 
results indicate that left-wing governments are positively related to unemployment 
protection for both Western and Eastern European countries, but this linkage is 
conditional on the economic situation. Coordinated bargaining by strong and 
centrally organized labour unions has also a positive impact on benefit generosity. 
Moreover, we find a negative relationship between the strictness of employment 
protection legislation and the generosity of unemployment benefit schemes, which 
is in line with the concept of the flexicurity model. Finally, within the EU we find a 
trend of convergence of unemployment benefit levels in the period 1990-2009. This 
finding indicates that the new EU member states have caught up. 
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1. Introduction 
Discussions on how to organize European labour markets are one of the key public 
policy issues of today. In European policy debates, the most important concepts seem 
to be ‘flexicurity’ and the ‘transitional labour market’. In a position paper (NEUJOBS 
milestone 13; Koster et al, 2011), we reviewed the existing conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical literature on these two ideal types of labour market models. Flexicurity refers 
to a combination of loose employment protection legislation (EPL), generous 
unemployment benefits and strong efforts on active labour market policies (ALMPs). 
The transitional labour market model offers a broad view of possible transitions that 
individuals may make during their life course. In this report, we examine the variation 
in unemployment benefits, EPL and ALMPs across countries and over time. These 
policies are building blocks of both the flexicurity model and the transitional labour 
market model. However, this report is more focused on the political economy of the 
flexicurity model. The transitional labour model will be examined in more detail in 
another report of Work Package 6 (NEUJOBS Deliverable 6.5; Koster and Fleischmann, 
2012) 
Based on the literature review in the position paper (NEUJOBS milestone 13; Koster et 
al, 2011), we constructed two indicators to measure the cross-national variation and the 
changes over time for two labour market institutions. First, we collected new data and 
we used data from OECD and Eurostat databases to update the Welfare State 
Entitlements Data Set (Allan and Scruggs, 2004) until 2009 and to take the 
enlargements of the EU into account. This resulted in the Unemployment replacement 
rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 (NEUJOBS milestone 14; Van Vliet and 
Caminada, 2012). Second, we constructed a new indicator for employment relations. 
This index enables us to analyze the variation in employment relations across the 27 
member states of the EU and 7 non-EU countries.   
Subsequently, we test a number of hypotheses from the political economy literature 
with regard to the cross national variation and the developments of labour market 
policies. The dependent variable of our study is the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, which are a key element of the flexicurity model. In this report, we examine 
hypotheses on the role of partisan politics, employment relations and EPL and ALMPs 
in unemployment benefit reform. To test the hypotheses, we employ pooled time series 
cross-section analyses.  
                                                     
* Olaf van Vliet, Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard are at Leiden University. This paper is written 
within (and for) Work Package 6 of NEUJOBS, a research project financed by the European Commission, 
under the 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement 266833). We thank Miroslav Beblavý and an 
anonymous referee for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.  
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In this report, we seek to make three contributions to the existing political economy 
literature on labour market policies. First, we aim to provide new insight in the 
association between partisan politics and unemployment protection. Building on the 
classical debate on whether leftist and rightist parties play different roles in welfare 
state reforms (e.g. Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi and 
Palme, 2003), recent research has shown that the effect of political parties is conditional 
on socio-economic conditions (Vis, 2009; Jensen, 2012). We show that the effect of left-
wing governments is conditional on socio-economic conditions. Second, we account for 
the fact that labour market policies are embedded in a number of other policies. In 
contrast, labour market policies are generally treated as isolated policy instruments in 
the quantitative comparative political economy literature (Koster et al, 2011). Hence, to 
explain the variation in unemployment benefits, we also account for EPL and ALMPs. 
Third, we examine whether the political economy of labour market models and 
employment relations is comparable for West and East European countries. Labour 
market policies in Central and East European (CEE) countries seem to develop 
differently than labour market policies in West European countries (Beblavý, 2011; 
Cerami, 2010; Koster et al, 2011; Põder and Kerem, 2011). As the political economy 
literature on labour market policies is mainly focused on Western OECD countries, it is 
still an empirical question whether determinants from this literature can account for 
the variation in labour market policy reforms across Western and Eastern European 
countries.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss a number 
of hypotheses from the political economy literature. In section 3, the measures and 
method used in the empirical analysis will be described. Here, we present the new 
indicators on net unemployment replacement rates and employment relations. 
Subsequently, section 4 presents the results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes the 
paper by discussing the main findings. 
2. The political economy of labour market policies 
2.1 European welfare states 
The variation across European welfare states has been analyzed extensively for a 
considerable period, but the scholarly debate has gotten a new dimension since the 
expansion of the EU with CEE countries. Some studies found that the welfare state in 
CEE countries can be classified along the lines of the typologies which have been 
developed for mainly Western welfare states (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts and 
Gelissen, 2006) and that some CEE welfare states are catching up with Western Europe 
(Manning, 2004; Vasconcelos Ferreira and Figueiredo, 2005). However, other studies 
found empirical support for the argument that the welfare states in CEE countries form 
a separate, CEE welfare regime (Fenger, 2007; Põder and Kerem, 2011). At least, the 
variation between the groups of West and East European welfare states appears to be 
larger than the variation within those groups (Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010). Hence, 
Cerami (2006) has argued that the welfare states in post-communist countries can be 
considered as a distinct welfare regime that consists of pre-communist (Bismarck social 
insurance), communist (universalism, corporatism and egalitarianism) and post-
communist (market-based schemes) components. Another distinctive characteristic is 
that welfare state arrangements are more generous in Western than in Eastern Europe. 
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According to recent studies, there is no evidence that this gap has been closed and that 
West and East European welfare states have converged (Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010; 
Põder and Kerem, 2011). This lack of convergence indicates that Western and Eastern 
welfare states have followed different trajectories of reforms, which might (partly) be 
due to the key explanatory variables for the cross-country variation in welfare state 
reform, namely partisan politics and corporatism. 
2.2 Partisan politics 
Partisan differences are traditionally considered as important explanatory factors for 
the variation in the generosity of welfare states in the political economy literature. The 
key argument is that left-wing parties have a preference for expansions of welfare state 
arrangements, while right-wing parties are associated with welfare state 
retrenchments. This argument has been extensively analyzed and the evidence 
provided by empirical research is rather ambiguous. The results of some studies 
support the hypothesis that leftist governments pursue different welfare state reforms 
than rightist governments (e.g. Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan 
and Scruggs 2004), whereas other studies find little evidence for this hypothesis (Ross, 
2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001 ). 
Subsequently, the contradictory results from empirical research have led to the 
formulation of the hypothesis that partisan differences have become less important in 
welfare state reform (Pierson, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Castles, 2001). An 
important explanation for this diminishing partisan effect is that differences in policy 
preferences are mitigated by fiscal pressure from external economic shocks. 
Persistently high levels of joblessness lead to high expenditures on unemployed 
benefits and therefore to budgetary stress, regardless of the colour of the government 
(Saint-Paul 1996, Gaston and Rajaguru 2008). Indeed, relying on fuzzy set qualitative 
analysis, Vis (2009) found that deteriorating economic situations trigger cuts in 
unemployment benefits by both rightist and leftist governments. However, this does 
not imply that partisan differences do not matter. Building on prospect theory, Vis 
(2009) explains that rightist governments do not pursue more or harsher reforms than 
leftist governments, but that rightist governments are more likely to pursue benefit 
cuts than leftist ones. The notion that both left-wing and right-wing governments opt 
for retrenchments in times of high levels of unemployment has also been observed in 
CEE countries. In order to confine the expansion of public expenditures on welfare 
state arrangements resulting from rapidly increasing unemployment rates during the 
second half of the 1990s, welfare cuts have been pursued by centre-right parties as the 
ODS in Czech Republic as well as by left-wing parties like the MSZP in Hungary and 
the Solidarity coalitions in Poland (Cerami, 2010). 
On the contrary, Jensen (2012) finds that the negative effect of right-wing governments 
on unemployment benefit reforms becomes smaller when unemployment rates 
increase. That is, right-wing governments have less room for retrenchments at higher 
levels of unemployment. Jensen’s argument is based on a median voter model. When 
labour market risks increase because of higher unemployment levels, the median voter 
will start feeling insecure and change his preferences. Because of a higher demand for 
unemployment protection exerted by the median voter, right-wing governments have 
less possibilities for retrenchments. Moreover, Jensen (2012) argues that because left-
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wing as well as right-wing parties can be expected to seek to win over the median 
voter, both parties act alike and expand spending at high levels of unemployment.  
In summary, both leftist and rightist governments are faced with a budgetary need to 
cut unemployment benefits in times of increasing levels of unemployment, while the 
same circumstances constrain both government types to pursue such cuts for electoral 
reasons. This leaves us with the empirical question which effect prevails. Hence, we 
test the hypothesis that the impact of the left/right-wing partisan government 
composition on unemployment protection reform is conditional on shocks to the 
economy. Furthermore, we examine whether the partisan effect differs across West- 
and East-European countries, although, as mentioned above, we have no reason to 
expect that this would be the case. 
2.3 Employment relations 
Besides political parties, social partners are important actors in the reform processes of 
unemployment protection. The relationship between industrial relations and the 
welfare state has received a lot of attention in the political economy literature. 
Generally, a corporatist tradition of coordinated bargaining by strong and centrally 
organized social partners is positively associated with welfare state generosity for two 
reasons (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Brandl and Traxler, 2005; Swank and Martin, 
2001; Swank, 2011). A first reason why a positive effect of corporatist institutions can 
be expected is that unions exchange wage moderation for full employment 
commitments and expansions in unemployment protection. Second, the more social 
interests are incorporated in policy-making processes, the more influence they can 
exert on policy reforms. Institutionalized bargaining is beneficial for both social 
partners and governments, since they exchange social acceptance for influence over 
policy reforms. Hence, in a system where collective bargaining is organized at the 
national level, social partners are better able to resist welfare state retrenchments. 
Several scholars have argued that social partners are less effective in exerting influence 
in welfare state reform in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Although tripartite 
councils have been introduced in many post-communist countries since the 1990s, this 
has not resulted in genuine influence of labour in the policy making process and in 
concrete material benefits in terms of welfare state arrangements (Ost, 2000; Avdagic, 
2005; Hassel, 2009). A first explanation for this difference between East and West is that 
corporatism functions differently in East than in West European countries. Trade 
unions in CEE countries have originated from a totally different situation than western 
unions. During the transition process, the market economy was still developing and 
political and societal power structures were completely redefined (Hassel, 2009). In 
contrast to the West, where tripartism began as a government action to mediate the 
conflicting interests of labor and capital, in CEE countries corporatism can be 
considered as a way of providing societal support for the government to pursue 
economic reforms (Ost, 2000). In a second explanation are the differences in the 
influence of the social partners on welfare state reform between Western and Eastern 
Europe a function of the strength and the organization of the social partners. In CEE 
countries, labour unions are almost only present in state-owned and formerly state-
owned enterprises, not in private firms (Ost, 2000). Furthermore, after the communist 
era employees considered ‘capitalism’ as a popular concept. Unions were associated 
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with communism and therefore East European employees have been reluctant to 
construct strong labour unions. They were afraid that strong unions would reduce 
their chances to benefit from the new economic system and to catch up to Western 
Europe (Ost, 2000). The explanation that the social partners in Eastern Europe are less 
effective in influencing reforms because they are weaker and bargaining is 
decentralized, could also account for the variation in effectiveness that has been 
observed within the group of CEE countries (e.g. Avdagic, 2005; Beblavý et al, 2011; 
Beblavý, 2011; Beblavý et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, it could be expected that the role of social partners in unemployment 
protection reform depends on the socio-economic situation. When unemployment rates 
increase, the risk of joblessness increases and generous unemployment benefits become 
more important for employees. Moreover, as labour markets become less tight, the 
chance that unions are successful in wage negotiations decreases. Therefore, the 
preferences of unions change and they are more prepared to accept wage moderation 
in exchange for less unemployment benefit cuts. 
Hence, we test the hypothesis that a corporatist tradition of policy-making has a 
positive effect on the generosity of unemployment benefit schemes. Furthermore, we 
examine whether this relationship can also provide an explanation for the differences 
in unemployment protection reforms across West and East European countries, or 
whether corporatism functions differently in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. 
Finally, we test the hypothesis that the positive effect of corporatism on unemployment 
protection reform increases at higher levels of unemployment. 
2.4 Employment protection legislation and active labour market policies 
In addition to partisan politics and employment relations, the relationships between 
different labour-market policy instruments are important in policy reforms. A single 
labour-market policy instrument is embedded in a large number of welfare state 
institutions in a country. These interrelationships have been taken into account in the 
welfare regime literature in which welfare states are regarded and conceptualised as 
configurations of various policy instruments (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, in the 
quantitative comparative political economy literature, welfare state institutions are 
generally treated as isolated policy instruments. In the case of unemployment benefits, 
especially employment protection legislation (EPL) and active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) are relevant. Unemployment benefits and employment protection are often 
considered as substitutes in terms of providing income protection to employees (e.g. 
Blanchard and Tirole, 2004; Blanchard and Tirole, 2008; Boeri et al., 2006).1 Hence, 
when EPL decreases, it can be expected that unemployment benefits become more 
generous.  
The trade-off between unemployment benefits and EPL is the main axis of the 
flexicurity model of the EU. At the EU level, the concept of flexicurity is integrated in 
the European Employment Strategy, which is aimed at increasing employment and 
reducing unemployment. The main characteristic of flexicurity is that it is intended to 
overcome the tensions between labour market flexibility on the one hand, and the 
                                                     
1 In theory, unemployment insurance and employment protection could be considered as substitutes. We 
realize that there are considerable differences in conditions, design and incentives in practice. 
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provision of social security for workers on the other hand (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). 
Flexibility and security are viewed as complementary. The flexicurity model builds on 
the combination of flexible labour markets, generous unemployment benefits and a 
strong emphasis on activation. Flexible labour markets can be seen as beneficial for job 
creation, especially during periods of recovery after recessions, but they generally 
imply lower levels of economic security. Welfare state programmes such as 
unemployment benefit schemes provide economic security, but they can have adverse 
effects, such as longer unemployment spells and therefore higher public expenditure 
and less mobility on the labour market. Furthermore, ALMPs such as labour market 
training, services of employment agencies and subsidized employment are aimed at 
increasing labour market participation and at reducing the adverse effects of generous 
unemployment benefit schemes.  
Flexicurity is presented as a package of policy reforms for the labour market. Lower 
levels of employment protection for employees are compensated with more generous 
unemployment benefits and with high efforts on ALMPs (EC, 2006; EC, 2007a; EC, 
2007b; Boeri e.a., 2007; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2007). Such reform packages 
could be successful, as they can be expected to overcome the opposition from 
employees (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2005). Hence, we test the hypotheses that the 
strictness of EPL is negatively related to the generosity of unemployment benefit 
schemes and that efforts on ALMPs are positively related to the generosity of 
unemployment protection.  
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Country selection and period of analysis 
In order to analyze whether the associations between labour relations and the partisan 
government composition on the one hand and unemployment benefit programs on the 
other are comparable between the Western and the CEE member states of the EU, all 27 
EU member states are included. Since most of the empirical literature on welfare state 
reform has been focused on a typical group of Western OECD countries, a group that 
consists of EU countries and non-EU countries, we also examine whether the findings 
can be generalized to other advanced non-EU industrialist countries. In total, 34 
countries are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
One of the main reasons for the fact that CEE countries are rarely included in the 
comparative welfare state literature is the limited availability of data. Since the 
transition of the CEE countries in the 1990s, more and more data have become 
available and international institutions and scholars have started to construct and 
expand internationally comparable data sets which include both West and East 
European countries and other countries. As for our country sample most data is 
available for the period 1990 – 2009, this is the period the study is focused on.2 
                                                     
2 Our data is available upon request. 
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3.2 Dependent variable 
In the welfare state literature, there is a lively debate going on about the selection of the 
measures to compare welfare states with. This issue is known as the ‘dependent 
variable problem’ (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). Often, expenditure ratios are used to 
compare social and labour market policies. But differences across countries in 
expenditure ratios do not always reflect social policy or the generosity of welfare 
systems. They may also reflect differences in unemployment rates or demographic 
structure across countries. Comparative studies of social security systems have 
increasingly turned to the use of (net) replacement rates as measures of the level of 
benefits in different countries and therefore of the degree of social protection offered 
by different welfare systems (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001 and 2002). Using 
replacement rate data has the advantage of allaying some of the concerns that apply to 
social expenditure data; see among others Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Castles (2004). 
More importantly, it is also more clearly how changes in the welfare state have 
impacted upon the life chances of ‘typical’ individuals in the labour market (Allan and 
Scruggs, 2004: 501). 
For this study we use data from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012). Their Unemployment 
replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 provides systematic data on 
net unemployment replacement rates for singles persons and for a household with a 
dependent spouse, two children and a head of household drawing the unemployment 
benefit (N x T = 4,026). In this analysis we took a sub-sample of our dataset and 
(re)calculated unweighted averages of net replacement rates for two family situations, 
for an unemployment spell of 1 year and for the average production worker wage, only 
for the period 1990-2009 (N x T = 515).  
The net unemployment replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the net income from 
unemployment benefits to the net income from work.3 Calculations assume a worker, 
aged 40, who earns the average production worker wage.4 Benefits for families include 
child benefits, including means tested benefits. 
It should be noted that our dataset calculates net replacement rates for an average 
production worker in the initial phase of unemployment. This net replacement rate 
differs from a person in the 30th or 60th month of benefit receipt. In most countries the 
net replacement rate at the beginning of unemployment is relatively high for a couple 
                                                     
3 The net replacement rate varies according to the type of household, employee, sector of industry, wage 
and salary group and the reasons for not working. Hence, there is no such thing as the replacement rate in 
any country, rather there is a myriad of replacement rates corresponding to the specific personal and 
family characteristics of the unemployed, their previous history of work and unemployment, and the 
different structures and entitlements of unemployment insurance and social assistance systems in 
countries and the ways in which these systems interact with tax systems. 
4 The OECD has made a fundamental change in the approach of the average wages. The classical approach 
of calculating the average wage was based on the average wage of a production worker (APW), which 
refers to the wage level in the manufacturing industry. The new concept for the average wage refers to the 
average worker wage (AW), which includes much more sectors. The differences in the levels of the APW 
and the AW can be significant for individual countries. The transition from APW to AW started in 2005 
and the AW is available from 2000 onwards. The APW data is available for all years up to 2005 and for the 
year 2007. Hence, there is no consistent time series for the period 1990-2009. In order to have a consistent 
replacement rate time series, Van Vliet and Caminada (2012) estimated the APW for the years 2006, 2008 
and 2009 based on the growth rate of the AW. 
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with two children, but lower for someone who is single. But here are, of course, 
substantial differences in the net replacement rate from one country to another.5  
Table 1 presents the replacement rates for 1990, 2000 and the most recent data year 
available (2009). Levels vary to a large extent across countries. The highest net 
replacement rates around 2009 are found for Luxembourg, Switzerland and Portugal, 
while rather low levels are found for Australia, Greece, Malta, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom. In most, but not all, countries the replacement rate for single persons lies 
below the level for one earner couples with two children. Exceptions are Japan, Latvia, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the United States. Furthermore, the level of 
unemployment protection is considerably lower in Eastern Europe than in Western 
Europe, especially for household with children. Also, we see that average replacement 
rates in CEE countries have fallen during the period 1990-2009.  
 
                                                     
5 Hence, the fact that the replacement rate does not account for the duration of the unemployment benefit 
scheme and other characteristics such as eligibility criteria is a notable limitation of the indicator. 
However, at this point, our study does not deviate from other studies (e.g. Allan and Scruggs, 2004; 
Jensen, 2012; Vis, 2009). 
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Table 1. Net unemployment replacement rates around 1990, 2000 and 2009 
 Single person  One earner couple with two children 
        
  1990 2000 2009  1990 2000 2009 
Australia 0.31 0.28 0.23  0.68 0.66 0.57 
Austria 0.58 0.56 0.55  0.73 0.70 0.68 
Belgium 0.64 0.63 0.59  0.60 0.59 0.60 
Bulgaria 0.69 0.58 0.59  0.72 0.62 0.65 
Canada 0.65 0.63 0.58  0.71 0.76 0.71 
Cyprus 0.67 0.61 0.58  0.81 0.78 0.76 
Czech Republic 0.55 0.45 0.47  0.61 0.50 0.50 
Denmark 0.67 0.61 0.55  0.72 0.66 0.62 
Estonia 0.22 0.28 0.46  0.31 0.34 0.52 
Finland 0.63 0.58 0.54  0.73 0.69 0.64 
France 0.71 0.70 0.70  0.64 0.67 0.70 
Germany 0.63 0.60 0.60  0.70 0.71 0.71 
Greece 0.33 0.34 0.36  0.36 0.40 0.42 
Hungary 0.68 0.46 0.36  0.77 0.58 0.49 
Ireland 0.35 0.29 0.35  0.65 0.54 0.62 
Italy 0.24 0.41 0.58  0.31 0.52 0.68 
Japan 0.60 0.60 0.60  0.56 0.57 0.56 
Lithuania n.a. 0.42 0.49  n.a. 0.41 0.52 
Latvia 0.30 0.69 0.54  0.32 0.68 0.51 
Luxembourg 0.84 0.84 0.84  0.85 0.90 0.91 
Malta n.a. 0.29 0.30  n.a. 0.48 0.49 
Netherlands 0.73 0.73 0.68  0.78 0.78 0.73 
New Zealand 0.31 0.27 0.25  0.67 0.58 0.48 
Norway 0.66 0.66 0.67  0.73 0.73 0.72 
Poland 0.40 0.30 0.26  0.49 0.36 0.30 
Portugal 0.79 0.79 0.78  0.76 0.79 0.75 
Romania 0.70 0.72 0.59  0.75 0.75 0.63 
Spain 0.70 0.54 0.50  0.79 0.69 0.69 
Slovak Republic 0.68 0.57 0.64  0.74 0.61 0.58 
Slovenia 0.64 0.64 0.65  0.64 0.67 0.66 
Sweden 0.87 0.70 0.65  0.87 0.74 0.69 
Switzerland 0.72 0.72 0.71  0.83 0.82 0.83 
United Kingdom 0.21 0.19 0.17  0.37 0.54 0.50 
United States 0.58 0.58 0.58  0.60 0.57 0.53 
Mean 34 countries 0.57 0.54 0.53  0.65 0.63 0.62 
Coef of Variation 0.33 0.32 0.30  0.24 0.21 0.20 
        
Mean 27 EU 0.58 0.54 0.53  0.64 0.62 0.61 
Coef of Variation 0.34 0.32 0.28  0.27 0.22 0.20 
        Mean 15 West-EU 0.59 0.57 0.56  0.66 0.66 0.66 
Coef of Variation 0.35 0.32 0.29  0.26 0.18 0.16 
        Mean 10 CEE-EU 0.54 0.51 0.51  0.59 0.55 0.53 
Coef of Variation 0.33 0.28 0.24  0.29 0.25 0.19 
 
Note: around 1990 =average 1990-93; 2000 = average 1998-2001; around 2009 = average 2006-09. See 
Appendix A for more data years.  
Source:  Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 (Van Vliet and Caminada, 
2012) 
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3.3 Independent variables  
To analyze the role of social democratic and other left-wing parties in reforming 
unemployment benefit programmes, we use the percentage of total cabinet seats held 
by left-wing parties, weighted by the number of days the government was in office in a 
given year. For this variable, the study relies on data from the Comparative Political 
Data Set (Armingeon et al, 2011). 
In the comparative political economy literature, several measures have been developed 
which enable welfare state scholars to examine the role of employment relations. The 
data sets of these measures include many countries and years, but CEE countries are 
not included in any of those data sets. Therefore, we construct a measure of 
employment relations that makes it possible to compare the effect of employment 
relations on unemployment benefit programs across West and East European 
countries. This measure, that is based on a measure developed by Swank (2011), is an 
additive index (standardized scores) of several dimensions highlighted in the variaties-
of-capitalism literature. The first sub-indicator is a scale of the level of wage bargaining 
where a low score indicates fragmented bargaining, mostly at the company level, and a 
high score indicates economy-wide bargaining. The second measure gives an 
indication of the extent of involvement of the main union confederation in consultation 
with the government. The third measure is an index of the centralization of union 
confederation power, which includes the confederal control over appointment of 
leaders of affiliates, the confederal involvement in wage agreements negotiated by 
affiliate unions, the relative size of a joint strike fund and the confederal power over 
strikes by affiliates. The fourth indicator is the union density rate, measured as the net 
union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. A 
higher score on the aggregate index indicates stronger labour relations. Data on sub-
indicators are taken from Visser’s (2011) ICTWSS data set. Further details on the labour 
relations measure are provided in Appendix B. 
To examine the role EPL and ALMPs, two measures are included. For the strictness of 
EPL, we rely on an indicator that is provided by the OECD (2009). The indicator covers 
regular employment, temporary employment and the regulation on collective 
dismissals. It is calculated as a weighted average of sub-indicators of employment 
regulation, such as legislative provisions setting conditions under which a dismissal is 
justified, procedural inconveniences that an employer may face during a dismissal 
process, notice and severance pay provisions and the restrictions on the hiring of 
temporary employment by firms.6 The indicator is normalized to a scale from 0 to 6 
where a higher score indicates stricter employment regulation.7 Furthermore, we 
                                                     
6 The indicator includes six sub-measures for restrictions on the hiring of temporary employment: valid 
cases for the use of fixed-term contracts, the maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts, the 
maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts, the types of work for which temporary 
work agency employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum cumulated 
duration of temporary work agency contracts.      
7 A limitation of this indicator is that some characteristics of EPL may be not fully reflected. For instance, 
since notice periods and severance pay are not legally regulated in some countries, they might be provided 
by collective agreements or contractual extensions. Because there is no detailed information about such 
contractual provisions, the EPL index often relies on minimal requirements as provided by labour law. 
Another disadvantage is the lack of incorporation of judicial practices deviating from the minimal legal 
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analyze expenditures on ALMPs as a percentage of GDP. The main programmes 
included are public employment service, labour market training, job rotation, 
employment incentives, supported employment, direct job creation and start-up 
incentives. For this measure, data are taken from the OECD (2012). 
Furthermore, the study controls for the possible impact of globalization. The linkages 
between international economic integration and national welfare state reform have 
been analyzed extensively (Rodrik, 1998; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). To date, the 
scholarly debate is centered around two hypotheses. The efficiency hypothesis states 
that in reaction to increased economic integration, governments reduce their social 
protection levels to offer attractive conditions for firms. Hence, policy competition 
among countries results in a social race to the bottom. According to the compensation 
hypothesis welfare states are expanded in order to compensate the increased labour 
market risks faced by people due to economic integration. Leibrecht et al (2011) found 
that compensation effects are dominant in Western European countries, whereas 
efficiency effects prevail in CEECs. To control for the impact of globalization on 
national unemployment programmes, two types of international economic integration 
are included, namely trade openness and financial openness. The first variable is 
measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. The second 
variable is measured as the sum of the inflows and outflows of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) as a percentage of GDP. For both measures, data are taken from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). 
In addition, the study accounts for a number of socio-economic variables. Data on the 
unemployment rate, measured as the percentage of the labour force unemployed, are 
taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). GDP per capita is 
included in the model to control for the economic development of a country. More 
economically developed countries usually have more generous social protection 
systems, because people are prepared to spend larger shares of their income on the 
provision of social security when income rises (Meltzer and Richard, 1983). Therefore, 
a positive impact of GDP per capita on the level of unemployment benefits can be 
expected. Data on real GDP per capita are taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston 
et al, 2011). Finally, the model controls for the impact of fiscal stresses that flow from 
structural demographic changes on unemployment benefit programs by including the 
age dependency ratio. Data on this variable, measured as the ratio of people younger 
than 15 and older than 64 to the working-age population (15-64), are taken from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). 
3.4 Method 
To analyze the variation in the time series cross-section data the study relies on an 
error correction model, which is a conventional estimator in the political economy 
literature to examine welfare state reform (Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Swank, 2011). In 
an error correction specification, changes of the dependent variable are regressed on 
both the lagged levels and the changes of the independent variables and on the lagged 
level of the dependent variable. As such, the estimator is able to capture both short-
term transitory effects and long-term structural effects of the independent variables by 
                                                                                                                                                           
requirements (OECD, 2004). Despite these limitations, the index is a conventional summary measure to 
analyse a relatively large number of countries over a longer period.  
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modeling first differences and levels respectively (Beck, 1991; De Boef and Keele, 2008; 
Podestà, 2006).  
In the framework of this study, error correction models offer a number of advantages. 
First, analyzing changes in the dependent variable enables us to examine the 
determinants of the developments in unemployment benefit programs from 1990 
onwards. There are many differences between welfare state programs of West and East 
EU countries. Most notably is the fact that social benefits are generally more generous 
in West than in East EU countries. As explanations for this difference in benefit levels 
are mainly related to the different paths of welfare state development in East and West 
European countries in the twentieth century, corporatism and the partisan composition 
of governments cannot be expected to explain absolute replacement rate levels (cf. 
Jensen, 2012).8 Furthermore, welfare state institutions such as unemployment benefits 
demonstrate high levels of serial correlation. An important advantage of error 
correction models is that they are better able to cope with such problems than 
specifications in levels only (Beck, 1991; De Boef and Keele, 2008). Hence, the 
estimating equation for the empirical model is: 
∆yit = α + θyit-1 + Σ βj X jit 1  + Σ γj∆X jit  + εit 
where ∆yit denotes the first difference in the dependent variable in country i and year t; 
α is the intercept and ε is the error term. X is a vector of independent variables, for 
which the short-term effects are indicated by the γ coefficient. The long-term effects of 
the independent variables are estimated by dividing the coefficient for the level 
variable (β) by the negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (θ). 
Furthermore, the lagged level of the replacement rate captures cross-national 
convergence of replacement rates (Plümper and Schneider, 2009). A negative 
coefficient θ would imply that below average benefit levels are catching up and that 
above average benefits are related to cuts, conditional on the other independent 
variables. 
We employ ordinary least squares regression analyses. The main model specification 
does not include country fixed effects because of two reasons. First, the inclusion of 
both a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects renders the estimator 
inconsistent (Nickell, 1991). Second, country fixed effects completely absorb differences 
in the level of independent variables across countries (Plümper et al, 2005). Because 
there is not much variation over time in one of the theoretically important independent 
variables of this study, corporatism, we follow the emerging convention in the 
literature for such cases which is not including country fixed effects (Jensen, 2012; 
Swank, 2011). Panel-corrected standard errors are applied to correct for panel-
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995).9 
                                                     
8 Nevertheless, estimation results of specifications using level variables are shown in the section on 
sensitivity analyses.  
9 In the section on sensitivity analyses, we also present estimation results with country and year fixed 
effects. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the means and the standard deviations of the dependent and the 
independent variables. In line with the findings in the existing literature, the 
corporatism index, for which the standardized z-scores range from -1.76 for weak 
corporatism to +1.76 for strong corporatism, indicates that corporatism is weaker in 
CEE countries than in Western Europe. The globalization variables trade and FDI 
indicate that Eastern European countries have opened up their economies rapidly. The 
socio-economic conditions vary considerably across West and Eastern European 
countries. In Western Europe, the GDP per capita is higher and the unemployment 
rates are lower, but the age dependency ratio is higher. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Net replacement rate Left government Right government 
  1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Mean 34 countries 0.61 0.58 0.57 28.2 38.5 36.3 41.3 37.1 41.7 
Standard Deviation 0.17 0.14 0.13 30.0 33.4 29.6 35.7 32.6 32.4 
           
Mean 27 EU 0.61 0.58 0.57 27.0 44.0 37.1 37.3 34.8 38.0 
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.15 0.13 27.6 33.9 28.8 34.3 31.6 31.5 
           
Mean 15 West-EU 0.63 0.62 0.61 31.5 57.6 36.1 38.0 20.1 38.7 
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.15 0.13 27.7 34.6 30.2 38.9 26.1 37.1 
           
Mean 10 CEE-EU 0.57 0.53 0.52 24.7 30.3 41.5 39.9 55.2 42.1 
Standard Deviation 0.17 0.14 0.11 27.5 24.6 26.5 27.5 22.9 21.0 
          
 Corporatism (-/+ 1.76) FDI as % GDP Trade as % GDP 
  1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Mean 34 countries 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 4.2 20.5 30.6 77.0 93.8 103.1 
Standard Deviation 0.73 0.82 0.74 11.4 65.5 113.6 40.4 48.8 54.1 
             
Mean 27 EU 0.21 0.10 0.03 4.6 24.4 36.7 85.0 103.7 115.1 
Standard Deviation 0.66 0.78 0.71 12.8 73.3 126.8 40.5 48.5 53.3 
             
Mean 15 West-EU 0.41 0.45 0.41 7.3 39.8 54.9 73.6 95.4 105.7 
Standard Deviation 0.68 0.69 0.63 17.0 97.2 167.4 40.8 56.4 64.3 
             
Mean 10 CEE-EU -0.11 -0.43 -0.53 1.5 5.3 13.2 91.7 109.0 125.3 
Standard Deviation 0.52 0.66 0.47 1.2 2.4 16.2 30.3 30.7 29.4 
          
 Unemployment rate GDP per capita Age dependency ratio 
  1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Mean 34 countries 8.2 8.0 6.6 20.570 24.903 30.253 50.2 48.9 47.3 
Standard Deviation 4.6 4.0 2.1 9.589 11.674 13.782 3.5 2.8 3.9 
            
Mean 27 EU 8.6 8.7 7.1 18.455 22.547 28.028 50.4 48.6 46.9 
Standard Deviation 4.9 4.1 2.0 9.397 11.626 14.276 3.5 2.8 4.1 
            
Mean 15 West-EU 8.3 7.3 6.9 25.191 30.701 36.453 49.8 49.6 49.9 
Standard Deviation 4.0 3.5 2.0 6.921 8.812 13.782 4.2 2.7 2.2 
            
Mean 10 CEE-EU 10.4 11.5 7.8 9.177 11.212 16.890 50.8 47.3 43.3 
Standard Deviation 5.9 3.9 1.8 2.997 3.990 4.829 2.0 2.6 2.7 
 
Notes:  
- Around 1990 =average 1990-93; 2000 = average 1998-2001; around 2009 = average 2006-09 
- Replacement rates are calculated as unweighted averages of net benefits for two family situations 
- Real GDP per capita, PPP converted, at 2005 dollars, constant prices 
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Table 3 shows the variation across countries and over time for the EPL indicator and 
for expenditures on ALMPs as percentage of GDP. Because data on these measures is 
not available for most of the CEE countries, means and standard deviations are only 
presented for two country groups.10 The data show that the strictness of EPL declined 
between 1990 and 2009.11 Furthermore, the scores on the EPL indicator and the 
expenditures on ALMPs are in most of the EU countries higher than in non-EU 
countries.  
Table 3. Employment protection legislation and ALMP expenditure 
 EPL ALMP as % GDP 
 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2009 
Australia 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Austria 2.2 2.2 1.9 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Belgium 3.2 3.2 2.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Canada 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Czech Republic 1.9 1.9 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Denmark 2.4 1.5 1.5 0.9 1.8 1.4 
Finland 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.0 0.9 
France 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.9 1.2 0.9 
Germany 3.2 2.3 2.1 1.2 1.2 0.8 
Greece 3.5 3.5 2.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Hungary 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Ireland 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.6 
Italy 3.6 2.5 1.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 
Japan 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Netherlands 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.1 
New Zealand 0.9 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 
Norway 2.9 2.6 2.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 
Poland 1.4 1.4 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Portugal 3.9 3.7 3.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Slovak Republic 1.8 1.8 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Spain 3.8 3.0 3.0 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Sweden - 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.0 1.2 
Switzerland 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.3 
United States - 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Mean 25 countries 2.2 1.9 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Standard deviation 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 
       
Mean 18 EU countries 2.4 2.2 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Standard deviation 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 
 
Notes:  
- Around 1990 =average 1990-93; around 2000 = average 1998-2001; around 2009 = average 2006-09 
- EU-18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom  
                                                     
10 Because the values for EPL for Sweden and the United States are missing, we also calculated the means 
and the standard deviations for a group of 23 countries and a group of 17 EU countries. For both country 
groups, the trends between 1990 and 2009 are similar to the trends presented in Table 3.  
11 It has been well documented that reforms aimed at flexibilisation have regularly resulted in two-tier 
reforms, in which the employment protection for temporary contracts has been reduced, while the 
employment protection for permanent contracts has remained unchanged (Saint-Paul, 2004; Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2007; Van Vliet and Nijboer, 2012).  
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- 25 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
4.2 Regression results 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analyses of net unemployment benefit 
replacement rates for four different country groups for the period 1990-2009. For all 
country samples the models show a negative association between left-wing 
governments and replacement rates. These results do not provide support for the 
argument that leftist governments are associated with expansions or less 
retrenchments of unemployment protection. In fact, the findings suggest an opposite 
relationship. In contrast, the results for right-wing governments are in line with the 
argument that right-wing parties are associated with unemployment benefit cuts.12 
With respect to corporatism, the models show a positive and strongly significant effect 
of corporatism. In line with our hypothesis, this result tends to indicate that social 
partners are better able to resist benefit cuts when they are more involved in national 
policy-making processes. The result for the group of CEE countries indicates that the 
variation in corporatism is also significantly correlated to the variation in replacement 
rates within the group of East European countries. Furthermore, the combination of the 
findings for the group of 27 EU countries and the 10 CEE countries sheds light on the 
variation in the role of industrial relations between Western and Eastern Europe. The 
findings suggest that it is the variation in the strength and the organization of the social 
partners across Western and Eastern countries that accounts for different 
unemployment benefit reforms rather than the variation in the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining. The lack of significance for the group of the 15 Western countries 
is probably due to the fact that this is a rather homogenous group with less variation 
(over time), because the coefficient for corporatism is strongly significant for the 
estimation for 27 countries. Moreover, this result is in line with Swank (2011), who did 
not find a significant effect of national coordination for Western countries either. 
Regarding the globalization variables, the results presented Table 4 indicate that within 
the group of 15 West-EU countries, high levels of capital mobility are positively and 
significantly related to changes in unemployment benefit levels. This implies that the 
compensation effect dominates in the West-EU countries, which is in line with the 
findings of Leibrecht et al (2010). However, this effect cannot be found for trade 
openness. In the CEE-EU countries, changes in capital mobility are positively 
associated with changes in unemployment schemes, but this effect has not culminated 
in a significant structural effect. The transitory and structural effects of trade openness 
show opposite coefficients for the CEE-EU countries. It could be the case that in the 
short run increases in trade openness have resulted in benefit cuts. Especially during 
the transition period, many Eastern European governments have been active in 
applying fiscal policy tools to create attractive conditions for firms, such as cuts in 
corporate income taxes (Drahokoupil, 2009; Leibrecht et al, 2010). Then, benefit cuts 
may be necessary to balance the budget again. In the long run, after a period of trade 
                                                     
12 However, these effects for right-wing governments are not robust. When the effects of left-wing 
governments and right-wing governments are estimated in separate models, the effects of right-wing 
governments are not significant. This is in line with the results presented below. 
 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  17 
 
 
liberalization, the demand for social benefits has increased to compensate the risks 
stemming from the increased dynamics on the labour market as a result of the high 
levels of trade openness. Indeed, unemployment levels have increased and labour force 
participation among elderly people and women has decreased considerably after the 
transition crisis (Avdagic, 2005; Havlik and Landesmann 2004; Onaran 2008). 
Interestingly, in the EU as a whole, the changes and the levels of trade openness are 
negatively and significantly related to changes in replacement rates. These results lend 
support to the efficiency hypothesis, stating that increases in trade openness lead to 
policy competition among countries resulting in cuts in unemployment benefits. 
Turning to the socio-economic variables, the results indicate that the unemployment 
rate is negatively related to the replacement rate. This is in line with the expectation 
that persistently high levels of joblessness generate budgetary problems and therefore 
lead to cuts in unemployment benefits. However, the coefficients for the long term 
effects are only significant in the group of 15 West-EU countries and the 10 CEE 
countries. The results for the short term effects are not significant. Interestingly, the 
results show rather mixed effects of GDP per capita. In the large country groups of 34 
countries and 27 EU countries, GDP per capita is positively and significantly related to 
unemployment replacement rates, whereas in the groups of the 15 West-EU countries 
and the 10 CEE-EU countries the relationship between these two variables is negative 
and significant. This difference can probably be explained by the fact that there is much 
more variation in GDP per capita in the large groups than in the small groups. The 
large groups consist of both Western countries with relatively high levels of GDP per 
capita and Eastern countries with relatively low GDP per capita. Hence, the GDP per 
capita variable captures the effect that economically more developed countries have 
more generous welfare states. In the smaller and more homogenous groups, this co-
variation cannot be found. Here, the negative coefficients for GDP per capita are 
probably indicative of a denominator effect. If incomes grow at a faster rate than 
unemployment benefit levels, replacement rates become lower. Subsequently, the 
results for the age dependency ratio do not provide much evidence for the expectation 
that demographic changes in the ratio between dependent people and the labour force 
reduce the fiscal room for income replacement schemes for the unemployed. Only in 
the 10 CEE countries there is a negative and strongly significant relationship between 
age dependency ratios and unemployment replacement rates.  
The negative and strongly significant coefficients for the lagged dependent variable 
indicate convergence of the replacement rates in the period 1990-2009 in all four 
models. The convergence of unemployment benefit replacement rates in the 15 West-
EU countries is in line with the convergence across those countries indicated by other 
welfare state indicators (Caminada et al, 2010). Interestingly, the magnitude of the 
coefficients indicate that the trend of convergence is the strongest across the 10 CEE 
countries. This is in line with the trends presented in Table 1. The estimates for the 27 
EU countries indicate that convergence of the level of unemployment benefits has also 
taken place in the EU as a whole, which is stronger than in the group of 34 countries. 
Moreover, the fact that the coefficient for the lagged replacement rate for the 27 
countries is higher than the coefficient for the group of the 15 West-EU countries 
indicates that, keeping other explanatory variables constant, the new member states 
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have caught up.13 These results for the CEE countries are at variance with the findings 
of Draxler and Van Vliet (2010) who found neither welfare state convergence among 
the CEE countries, nor between the West and East EU member states for the years 
2000-2006.  
 
Table 4. Net unemployment benefit replacement rates, 1990-2009 
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ Left government -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.028) 
Left government (t-1) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.050*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) 
Δ Right government -0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.021 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024) 
Right government (t-1) -0.008** -0.006 -0.013*** -0.038 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.381*** 0.299*** -0.004 2.894*** 
 (0.066) (0.111) (0.166) (0.863) 
Δ Capital mobility 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.015** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.004** 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Trade openness -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.009 -0.071*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.027) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.002 -0.005* 0.006* 0.037*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.147 0.163 -0.128 0.429* 
 (0.120) (0.131) (0.081) (0.227) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.032 -0.048 -0.070*** -0.342*** 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.024) (0.106) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.020* 0.026** -0.016 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.070) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.003** 0.004** -0.006*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.251 0.036 1.312*** -3.738*** 
 (0.174) (0.245) (0.398) (1.229) 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.030 -0.030 0.059 -0.587*** 
 (0.040) (0.057) (0.038) (0.135) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.211*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.035) 
Constant 4.362*** 4.812*** 2.625 45.020*** 
 (1.258) (1.813) (2.206) (8.711) 
N x T 515 382 269 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.060 0.066 0.085 0.197 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Replacement rates are calculated as unweighted averages of net benefits for two family situations (single 
person and one earner couple with two children), for an unemployment spell of 1 year and for the average 
production worker wage.  
                                                     
13 Interestingly, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that this is indeed only 
the case if we control for other explanatory variables.  
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In the next set of regressions we examine to what extent the relationship between 
partisan differences and corporatism on the one hand and unemployment benefit 
reforms on the other is conditional on the socio-economic situation. The results 
presented in Table 5 indicate that left-wing governments are positively and 
significantly related to unemployment protection, but that this positive effect becomes 
smaller at higher unemployment rates. At high unemployment rates, leftist 
governments are even negatively associated with unemployment protection levels. 
Interestingly, this result suggests that the constraining effect of rising unemployment 
stemming from budgetary pressure dominates the effect of the higher demand for 
unemployment protection from the median voter. The estimations for the 27 EU 
countries indicate that the positive effect of leftist governments turns into a negative 
effect around an unemployment rate of 8 percent. This effect is graphically illustrated 
in Figure 1. Furthermore, the results indicate that the relationship between leftist 
governments and unemployment benefits is comparable across West- and CEE-EU 
countries.14 The results for right-wing governments are not significant. Hence, the 
findings do not provide empirical evidence for the argument that the effect of right-
wing governments is conditional on the unemployment rate. 
 
                                                     
14 For the 15 West-EU countries, the coefficient for ‘Left government (t-1)’ does not reach significance. 
However, this variable is significant in models where the effects of left-wing and right-wing governments 
are estimated separately. 
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Table 5. Net unemployment benefit replacement rates and interaction effects, 1990-2009  
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ (Left government x  -0.001 -0.003 -0.002** 0.001 
   Unemployment rate) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.016*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Δ Left government 0.010 0.020 0.024* -0.033 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.064) 
Left government (t-1) 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.009 0.156*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.050) 
Δ (Right government x  -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 
   Unemployment rate) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.010** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Δ Right government 0.008 0.020 0.001 0.028 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.063) 
Right government (t-1) 0.003 0.008 -0.005 0.117** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.053) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.375*** 0.365*** 0.022 2.027** 
 (0.060) (0.104) (0.167) (0.842) 
Δ Capital mobility 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.011 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.017) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.001 0.000 0.004** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) 
Δ Trade openness -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.010 -0.078*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.024) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.003** -0.006*** 0.005 0.024** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.305* 0.417** -0.017 0.608 
 (0.160) (0.191) (0.127) (0.577) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.179*** 0.214*** 0.037 0.623** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.044) (0.276) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.021** 0.026** -0.013 0.024 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.058) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.004*** 0.006** -0.005*** -0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.228 -0.035 1.139*** -3.626*** 
 (0.179) (0.296) (0.423) (1.137) 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.058 -0.070 0.026 -0.525*** 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.041) (0.136) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.044*** -0.216*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.033) 
Constant 3.525* 3.753 2.553 28.654*** 
 (1.920) (2.519) (2.391) (9.144) 
N x T 515 382 269 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.088 0.103 0.089 0.262 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Marginal effect of left-wing governments 
95% Confidence Interval 
Figure 1.  Marginal effect of left-wing governments at various levels of unemployment, 27 EU 
countries 
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In the models presented in Table 6 we examine whether also the association between 
industrial relations and unemployment protection is conditional on the socio-economic 
situation. For the group of 27 EU countries, the results show a positive and significant 
interaction effect between corporatism and unemployment rates. This finding supports 
our expectation that in times of high unemployment rates labour unions are more 
willing to accept wage moderation in exchange for less harsh retrenchments on 
unemployment benefits. However, the evidence for this relationship is rather weak as 
it does not reach significance in the other country groups.  
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Table 6. Net unemployment benefit replacement rates, with corporatism interaction,  1990-2009  
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ Left government -0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.031) 
Left government (t-1) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.046** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) 
Δ Right government -0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.016 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.027) 
Right government (t-1) -0.008** -0.006 -0.014*** -0.034 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.026) 
Corporatism (t-1) x  0.035 0.068** -0.056 0.118 
    Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.023) (0.028) (0.045) (0.225) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.140 -0.231 0.386 1.857 
 (0.153) (0.257) (0.298) -2.379 
Δ Capital mobility 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.015** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.004** 0.015 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Trade openness -0.055*** -0.058** -0.007 -0.075*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.028) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.002 -0.006* 0.007* 0.033** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.142 0.154 -0.129 0.383 
 (0.123) (0.137) (0.080) (0.259) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.033 -0.053 -0.054** -0.279* 
 (0.042) (0.055) (0.026) (0.157) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.019* 0.025** -0.016* -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.074) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.003** 0.005** -0.006*** -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.237 -0.009 1.346*** -3.720*** 
 (0.180) (0.246) (0.393) -1.254 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.031 -0.037 0.065* -0.582*** 
 (0.040) (0.058) (0.037) (0.142) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.216*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.039) 
Constant 4.459*** 5.241*** 2.390 44.445*** 
 (1.263) (1.858) (2.187) (9.216) 
N x T 515 382 269 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.059 0.066 0.084 0.189 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Subsequently, we examine the role of employment protection legislation and active 
labour market policies in reforms of unemployment benefit schemes. The results of the 
estimations are presented in Table 7, indicating that the strictness of EPL is positively 
and significantly associated with unemployment protection. This is not in line with the 
hypothesis that the strictness of EPL is negatively related to the generosity of 
unemployment benefits. Accounting for ALMP expenditures does not alter these 
results and ALMP expenditures are not significantly related to unemployment 
protection. As the flexicurity strategy is a typical European model, we also estimated 
the models for a group of 18 EU countries. Again, the results do not lend support for 
the argument that unemployment benefits and EPL are considered as substitutes. The 
findings can probably be explained by the fact that the lagged levels of the 
independent variables capture the between-country variation, as the regressions do not 
include fixed effects. As such, the results indicate that countries with strict employment 
regulation have also high unemployment benefit levels.  
Furthermore, the results for left-wing and right-wing governments are largely in line 
with the estimations of the previous presented models. However, the coefficients for 
corporatism have lost their significance. This is probably due to the fact that 
corporatism is correlated with EPL and ALMP (correlation coefficients of 0.47 and 0.54 
respectively). 
 
Table 7. Net unemployment benefit replacement rates, EPL and ALMP,  1990-2009 
 
25 
countries 
25 
countries 
25 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
Δ (Left government x  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   Unemployment rate) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Left government 0.015* 0.013* 0.015* 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) 
Left government (t-1) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.026** 0.022** 0.021** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Δ (Right government x  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
   Unemployment rate) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Right government 0.017 0.001 0.005 0.043** 0.025 0.026 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Right government (t-1) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.106 0.205* 0.056 0.131 0.207 -0.007 
 (0.155) (0.119) (0.152) (0.185) (0.188) (0.172) 
Δ Capital mobility 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Capital mobility (t-1) -0.025** -0.019 -0.023* -0.040*** -0.034** -0.044*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Δ Trade openness -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.096*** -0.081*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Trade openness (t-1) 0.006* 0.006 0.008* 0.015*** 0.009* 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.054 0.039 0.025 0.155 0.115 0.095 
 (0.145) (0.129) (0.130) (0.158) (0.146) (0.147) 
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Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.163*** 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) -0.024 -0.030* -0.027 -0.044* -0.056** -0.053* 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.679** 0.699** 0.688** 0.783 0.737** 0.717** 
 (0.308) (0.280) (0.287) (0.477) (0.368) (0.355) 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.066* 0.024 0.073* 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.057*** -0.037*** -0.060*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) 
Δ EPL 1.379  0.934 1.605  1.189 
 (1.019)  (0.806) (1.053)  (0.859) 
EPL (t-1)  0.273  0.310** 0.667**  0.771*** 
 (0.169)  (0.127) (0.276)  (0.201) 
Δ ALMP expenditure  0.254 -0.328  0.119 -0.390 
  (0.718) (0.830)  (0.745) (0.888) 
ALMP expenditure (t-1)  -0.270 -0.203  -0.278 0.122 
  (0.275) (0.282)  (0.278) (0.267) 
Constant -0.528 -0.365 -1.369 -4.493** -1.304 -5.224*** 
 (1.397) (1.428) (1.470) (1.814) (1.892) (2.021) 
N x T 403 391 375 285 272 264 
Adj. R-Squared 0.083 0.079 0.078 0.119 0.092 0.112 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
EU-18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom  
25 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analyses 
To examine the robustness of the results, we run a number of additional regressions. 
First, we take into account that the error correction models presented above do not 
control for country and year fixed effects. Therefore, we also estimate level 
specifications of the models, which take the following form: 
yit = α + Σ βX 1it + μi + λt + εit 
Here, yit denotes the level of the dependent variable, α is the intercept, X is a vector of 
independent variables and country and year dummies are modelled by μ and λ 
respectively. The error term ε follows and AR(1)-process to correct for autocorrelation. 
Furthermore, panel-corrected standard errors are used to correct for panel-
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation. 
The first three columns of Table 8 present the results of estimation for the 27 EU 
countries. The results in the first column indicate that the effects for left-wing 
governments are in line with the results presented above. Remarkably, the results 
suggest that the effects of right-wing governments are comparable to the effects of left-
wing governments. However, the third column indicates that this effect for right-wing 
governments is not robust, whereas the second column shows that the results for left-
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wing governments are robust. As to corporatism, the regressions yield similar results 
as the models presented above. 
The next three columns present the results of the models with the EPL indicator and 
ALMP expenditures. Interestingly, these results differ strongly from the results 
presented above. In line with the hypotheses, the strictness of EPL is negatively 
associated with the generosity of unemployment benefit schemes and ALMP 
expenditures are positively related to unemployment protection. However, the result 
for ALMP expenditure does not hold when EPL and ALMP expenditure are both 
included. The results indicate that when we focus on the within-country variation with 
a fixed effects specification, EPL and unemployment benefits can be considered as 
substitutes. This result provides support for the idea behind the flexicurity model that 
lower levels of EPL for employees can be compensated with more generous 
unemployment benefits. Finally, the results for the globalization variables and the 
socio-economic variables are largely in line with the estimations of the previous 
models. 
 
Table 8. Fixed effects regressions of net unemployment benefit replacement rates, 1990-2009 
 
27 EU 
countries 
27 EU 
countries 
27 EU 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
18 EU 
countries 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.007*** -0.003***  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left government (t-1) 0.085*** 0.036***  0.076*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 
 (0.023) (0.010)  (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.004**  0.001 -0.005** -0.007*** -0.004* 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Right government (t-1) 0.064**  -0.009 0.057** 0.072*** 0.048** 
 (0.028)  (0.015) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) 
Corporatism (t-1) 1.556* 1.680* 1.706* -0.034 0.154 -0.158 
 (0.850) (0.874) (0.947) (1.058) (1.191) (1.100) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.035*** -0.051*** -0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.070*** -0.071** -0.076*** -0.054* -0.072** -0.043 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.415** 0.109 -0.042 0.210 0.267 0.208 
 (0.182) (0.156) (0.156) (0.164) (0.190) (0.177) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.024 -0.017 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) 0.567*** 0.579*** 0.572*** 0.538*** 0.662*** 0.560*** 
 (0.094) (0.106) (0.128) (0.154) (0.132) (0.167) 
EPL (t-1)     -3.357***  -3.758*** 
    (1.293)  (1.337) 
ALMP expenditure (t-1)     2.477** 0.190 
     (1.232) (1.036) 
Constant 30.776*** 32.226*** 34.229*** 53.742*** 38.385*** 48.585*** 
 (5.108) (6.006) (7.289) (12.520) (11.720) (13.945) 
       
Rho 0.579 0.568 0.569 0.651 0.599 0.632 
N x T 385 385 385 303 293 285 
Adj. R-Squared 0.917 0.916 0.915 0.909 0.910 0.913 
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Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; Prais-Winsten 
transformation [AR (1) disturbances]. 
Each regression includes country and year dummies (not shown here). 
EU-18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Furthermore, in the models presented in Table 4 - 7, we used the average of the net 
unemployment benefit replacement rates for two household types, namely a single 
person and a one earner couple with two children. Because social partners and political 
parties may pursue different tax and benefit policies for families than for singles, we 
analyze the net replacement rates for the two family types separately. The estimations 
presented in Table A3, Table A4, Table A5 of and Table A6 of Appendix C indicate that 
the use of other replacement rates does not alter the results.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation and active labour market 
policies are important building blocks of the most important labour market models in 
European policy debates, namely flexicurity and the transitional labour market. In this 
paper we analysed the cross-country variation in net unemployment benefit 
replacement ratios. We tested a number of hypotheses from the political economy 
literature on the role of partisan politics, employment relations and EPL and ALMPs in 
unemployment benefit reform. These factors haven been extensively studied in the 
political economy literature, but hardly for Eastern European countries, because of a 
lack of data. Relying on newly constructed indicators for Western and Eastern 
European countries, we employed pooled time series cross-section regression analyses 
to analyze the variation of the benefit generosity across countries and over time we. 
With respect to the effect of partisan politics, the results indicate that left-wing 
governments are positively and significantly related to benefit replacement ratios, but 
this positive effect becomes smaller at higher unemployment rates. These results 
provide empirical support for the argument that the impact of partisan politics 
depends on the economic and budgetary situation. In periods of high unemployment 
and fiscal pressure,  left-wing parties are forced to cut unemployment benefits. 
However, our findings are not in line with the argument that high unemployment 
levels constrain right-wing governments to pursue benefit cuts for electoral reasons. 
Moreover, we do not find substantial differences between Western and Eastern 
countries as far as the impact of partisan politics is concerned. 
As to the effect of employment relations, our estimates show a positive and significant 
correlation with unemployment protection levels. Coordinated bargaining by strong 
and centrally organized labour unions has a positive impact on benefit generosity. 
Furthermore, we found some weak evidence for a positive and significant interaction 
between employment relations and unemployment rates. This suggests that labour 
unions in times of high unemployment try to safeguard unemployment protection 
levels, possibly in exchange for wage moderation. Interestingly, we find a much 
stronger linkage between corporatism and unemployment benefits for the group of 
CEE countries than for the other countries in the sample. This is a surprising result, 
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because several authors have argued that social partners are less effective in exerting 
influence on labour market and welfare state reforms in Eastern Europe than in 
Western Europe. Corporatism is less developed in CEE countries according to several 
earlier studies. An explanation for our findings may be that the variation of the 
strength and organization of social partners over time has been larger in CEE countries 
than in the rest of the EU. Our results suggest that the differences in corporatism do 
have an impact on unemployment protection in CEE countries. 
In addition, the results of the fixed effects regressions show a negative relationship 
between the strictness of employment protection legislation and the generosity of 
unemployment benefit schemes. In line with the flexicurity model, this result supports 
the idea that more flexibility on the labour market is compensated with more generous 
unemployment benefits. Hence, flexicurity seems to be more than a theoretical labour 
market model.  
A final important result is that our estimates indicate convergence of net 
unemployment benefit replacement rates in the period 1990-2009. This trend of 
convergence is relatively strong for the group of CEE countries. As such, our findings 
indicate that the new EU member states have caught up.   
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Country Profiles for Net Unemployment Replacement Rates Single Person, 1990–2009 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Australia 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 
Austria 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Belgium 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63  0.65  0.65  0.64 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.59 
Bulgaria   0.67 0.71 0.70 0.51 0.34 0.66 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.66 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.54 0.60 
Canada 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 
Cyprus  0.65 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57   
Czech Republic    0.55 0.55 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.49 
Denmark 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Estonia   0.23 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 
Finland 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.54 
France 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.69 
Germany 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Greece  0.34 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.39 
Hungary 0.72 0.63 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 
Ireland 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 
Italy 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.63 0.63 
Japan 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61 
Lithuania      0.79 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.51 
Latvia  0.32 0.28 0.30 0.41 0.37 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.51 
Luxembourg 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Malta       0.26 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Netherlands 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 
New Zealand 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 
Norway 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 
Poland   0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.24 
Portugal 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Romania 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.61 0.65 
Spain 0.75 0.75 0.65 0.65 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.49 
Slovak Republic  0.71 0.71 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.66 0.51 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.63 
Slovenia  0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Sweden 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.81 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.60 
Switzerland 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 
United Kingdom 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
United States 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 
Mean 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
N  23 28 31 32 31 33 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 33 33 
Coef of Var 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
 
Source: Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 (Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012) 
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Table A2. Country Profiles for Net Unemployment Replacement Rates One Earner Couple with Kids, 1990–2009 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Australia 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.54 
Austria 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Belgium 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.60  0.61  0.61  0.60 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.60 
Bulgaria   0.70 0.74 0.73 0.55 0.41 0.70 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.59 0.66 
Canada 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.72 
Cyprus  0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76   
Czech Republic    0.61 0.54 0.49 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.52 
Denmark 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.62 
Estonia   0.35 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 
Finland 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.63 
France 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
Germany 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 
Greece  0.35 0.35 0.36  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 
Hungary 0.80 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.74 0.69 0.60 0.55 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.47 
Ireland 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.64 
Italy 0.29 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.73 0.73 
Japan 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Lithuania      0.77 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52 
Latvia  0.34 0.31 0.32 0.43 0.43 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.47 0.47 
Luxembourg 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90 
Malta       0.46 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 
Netherlands 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.72 
New Zealand 0.72 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 
Norway 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Poland   0.52 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.27 
Portugal 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Romania 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.68 
Spain 0.85 0.86 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 
Slovak Republic  0.77 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 
Slovenia  0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Sweden 0.81 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.64 
Switzerland 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
United Kingdom 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.52 
United States 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.52 
Mean 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 
N 23 28 31 32 30 33 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 33 33 
Coef of Var 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Source: Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009 (Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012) 
 
 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  35 
 
Appendix B: Labour relations index 
This measure, that is based on a measure developed by Swank (2011), is an additive 
index (standardized scores) of several dimensions highlighted in the variaties-of-
capitalism literature. The standardized z-scores range from -1.76 for weak labour 
relations to +1.76 for strong labour relations. The first sub-indicator is a scale of the 
level of wage bargaining where a low score indicates fragmented bargaining, mostly at 
the company level, and a high score indicates economy-wide bargaining. The second 
measure gives an indication of the extent of involvement of the main union 
confederation in consultation with the government. The third measure is an index of 
the centralization of union confederation power, which includes the confederal control 
over appointment of leaders of affiliates, the confederal involvement in wage 
agreements negotiated by affiliate unions, the relative size of a joint strike fund and the 
confederal power over strikes by affiliates. The fourth indicator is the union density 
rate, measured as the net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners in employment. A higher score on the aggregate index indicates greater 
corporatism. 
 
Coordination of wage bargaining 
5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central 
organisations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private 
sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling.  
4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations 
negotiatenon-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and 
employers associations set pattern for the entire economy.  
3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of 
central organizations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining.  
2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak enforceability 
of industry agreements  
1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level 
Note: this classification is based on Kenworthy’s 5-point classification of wage-setting 
coordination scores and in most countries and years the scores are the same as his. 
Source: ICTWSS data set (Visser, 2011). 
 
Political involvement of main union confederation 
Main confederation(s) represent(s) the affiliates politically and is routinely involved in 
consultation with government – either through bipartite or tripartite contacts.  
2 = extensive routine involvement in consultation. 
1 = moderate routine involvement in consultation. 
0 = little routine involvement in consultation. 
Source: ICTWSS data set (Visser, 2011). 
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Centralization of union confederation power 
This measure consists of an aggregate score of the following four dimensions 
(standardized to 0.0 – 4.0 scale): 
1. Confederal (political) control over appointment of leaders of affiliates 
2 = confederation appoints or has veto (directly or through government approval) 
1 = affiliates and confederations share control 
0 = confederation has no control over appointment process 
2. Confederal involvement in wage agreements negotiated by its affiliate unions 
2 = confederation has mandate to negotiate agreement with employers and/or 
government on wage issues 
1 = confederation has mandate to negotiate agreement with employers and/or 
government on non-wage issues 
0 = none of above 
3.  Confederal or joint strike fund from which member unions are reimbursed 
2 = joint strike or resistance fund has significant size (>=50 percent of total union 
expenditure on official strikes) 
1 = joint strike or resistance fund is limited (< 50 percent of total union 
expenditure on official strikes) 
0 = no joint strike or resistance fund held by confederation 
4.  Confederal power over strikes by affiliates 
2 = all strikes need prior approval from confederation 
1 = confederation can end strikes through central procedures of conflict 
settlement (arbitration) 
0 = confederation has no power over strikes organized by its affiliates 
Source: ICTWSS data set (Visser, 2011). 
 
Union density 
Union density rate, net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners 
in employment. Source: ICTWSS data set (Visser, 2011). 
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Appendix C: Replacement rates for two family types 
Table A3: Replacement rates single person, governments with interaction, 1990-2009 
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ (Left government x  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002** 0.000 
   Unemployment rate) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.017*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Δ Left government 0.012 0.018 0.020 -0.033 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.013) (0.070) 
Left government (t-1) 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.013 0.149*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.047) 
Δ (Right government x  -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 
   Unemployment rate) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.010** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Δ Right government 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.014) (0.072) 
Right government (t-1) 0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.106** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.051) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.338*** 0.370*** 0.117 2.065** 
 (0.072) (0.115) (0.136) (0.871) 
Δ Capital mobility 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.005*** -0.017 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) 
Δ Trade openness -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.003 -0.097*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.024) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.002 0.027*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.366 0.454* -0.031 0.614 
 (0.224) (0.257) (0.137) (0.640) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.198** 0.241*** 0.034 0.639** 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.049) (0.263) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.019** 0.023** -0.020** 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.066) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.004** -0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.064 -0.115 0.979** -3.953*** 
 (0.186) (0.261) (0.436) -1.125 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.083* -0.104 -0.023 -0.574*** 
 (0.048) (0.069) (0.048) (0.141) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.206*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.032) 
Constant 3.653** 4.198* 3.776 30.386*** 
 (1.756) (2.449) (2.677) (8.513) 
N x T 517 384 271 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.093 0.107 0.104 0.280 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A4: Replacement rates one earner couple, governments with interaction, 1990-2009 
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ (Left government x  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
   Unemployment rate) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Left government (t-1) x  -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002* -0.016*** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Δ Left government 0.009 0.024 0.028* -0.033 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.062) 
Left government (t-1) 0.024** 0.037*** 0.006 0.164*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.056) 
Δ (Right government x  -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 
   Unemployment rate) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Right government (t-1) x  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011** 
   Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Δ Right government 0.008 0.023 -0.002 0.039 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.059) 
Right government (t-1) 0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.130** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.058) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.396*** 0.378* -0.069 2.012** 
 (0.124) (0.212) (0.250) (0.894) 
Δ Capital mobility 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.011 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) 
Δ Trade openness -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.014 -0.059** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.002* -0.006** 0.009** 0.020* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.250** 0.391*** 0.016 0.605 
 (0.109) (0.148) (0.142) (0.564) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.164*** 0.187*** 0.045 0.612** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.052) (0.307) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.023* 0.027* -0.006 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.056) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.005*** 0.008** -0.005** -0.036** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.307 -0.073 1.121** -3.291*** 
 (0.242) (0.471) (0.473) -1.181 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.028 -0.030 0.072* -0.472*** 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.042) (0.135) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.065*** -0.077*** -0.067*** -0.228*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.035) 
Constant 3.191 3.322 1.906 26.866*** 
 (2.463) (2.850) (2.532) (9.970) 
N x T 515 382 269 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.072 0.088 0.062 0.215 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A5: Replacement rates single person, corporatism interaction, 1990-2009 
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ Left government -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.018 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.034) 
Left government (t-1) -0.012*** -0.012** -0.011*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) 
Δ Right government -0.010 -0.008 0.001 -0.025 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.029) 
Right government (t-1) -0.007 -0.005 -0.010** -0.044* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.027) 
Corporatism (t-1) x  0.042* 0.059** -0.003 0.053 
    Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.213) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.053 -0.170 0.110 2.538 
 (0.205) (0.304) (0.254) (2.344) 
Δ Capital mobility -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.014* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) 
Capital mobility (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.005*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) 
Δ Trade openness -0.059** -0.062** -0.002 -0.090*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.028) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.002 -0.005** 0.003 0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.142 0.161 -0.192** 0.423 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.084) (0.261) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.040 -0.045 -0.082*** -0.299* 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.018) (0.156) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.017* 0.023** -0.023** -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.083) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.002* 0.004** -0.006*** -0.047*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.077 -0.074 1.209*** -4.076*** 
 (0.225) (0.265) (0.394) -1.286 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.053 -0.065 0.026 -0.645*** 
 (0.045) (0.071) (0.042) (0.150) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.034*** -0.207*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.038) 
Constant 4.697*** 5.563*** 3.260 47.317*** 
 (1.233) (2.080) (2.415) (9.204) 
N x T 517 384 271 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.055 0.057 0.089 0.210 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A6: Replacement rates one earner couple, corporatism interaction, 1990-2009 
 34 countries 
27 EU 
countries 
15 West-EU 
countries 
10 CEE-EU 
countries 
Δ Left government 0.002 0.003 0.013 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.030) 
Left government (t-1) -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.033 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.022) 
Δ Right government -0.001 0.001 0.011 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.027) 
Right government (t-1) -0.008*** -0.008* -0.017*** -0.023 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.027) 
Corporatism (t-1) x  0.038 0.093** -0.095 0.188 
    Unemployment rate (t-1) (0.029) (0.043) (0.063) (0.251) 
Corporatism (t-1) 0.136 -0.384 0.570 1.162 
 (0.222) (0.458) (0.441) -2.485 
Δ Capital mobility 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.018* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) 
Capital mobility (t-1) -0.000 -0.001 0.004* 0.029** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
Δ Trade openness -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.010 -0.059* 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.031) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.001 -0.006* 0.011** 0.027* 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) 
Δ Unemployment rate 0.136 0.145 -0.057 0.340 
 (0.114) (0.132) (0.089) (0.273) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.026 -0.066 -0.030 -0.259 
 (0.035) (0.051) (0.039) (0.165) 
Δ GDP per capita (x 10-2) 0.022 0.025 -0.012 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.067) 
GDP per capita (x 10-2) (t-1) 0.004** 0.007* -0.006*** -0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.015) 
Δ Age dependency ratio 0.308 -0.072 1.277*** -3.353*** 
 (0.225) (0.414) (0.455) -1.262 
Age dependency ratio (t-1) -0.005 -0.005 0.099** -0.516*** 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.038) (0.137) 
Replacement rate (t-1) -0.067*** -0.080*** -0.074*** -0.227*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.041) 
Constant 4.015** 5.124*** 2.179 41.648*** 
 (1.816) (1.981) (2.396) (9.525) 
N x T 515 382 269 99 
Adj. R-Squared 0.054 0.068 0.066 0.147 
 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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